NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

SecureCore Software Architecture:
Trusted Management Layer (TML)
Kernel Extension Module Interface Specification

by

David J. Shifflett
Paul C. Clark
Cynthia E. Irvine
Thuy D. Nguyen
Timothy M. Vidas
Timothy E. Levin

January 2008

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF). Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of that agency.

Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized.

This report was prepared by:

David J. Shifflett  
Research Associate

Paul C. Clark  
Research Associate

Cynthia E. Irvine  
Professor

Thuy D. Nguyen  
Research Associate

Timothy M. Vidas  
Research Associate

Timothy E. Levin  
Research Associate Professor

Reviewed by:  

Released by:

Peter J. Denning, Chair  
Department of Computer Science

Dan C. Boger  
Interim Associate Provost and Dean of Research
This page intentionally left blank
**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. **AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)**

2. **REPORT DATE**
   29 January 2008

3. **REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED**
   Research; September 2006 - January 2008

4. **TITLE AND SUBTITLE**
   SecureCore Software Architecture: Trusted Management Layer (TML)
   Kernel Extension Module Interface Specification

5. **FUNDING**
   CNS-0430566

6. **AUTHOR(S)**
   David J. Shifflett, Paul C. Clark, Cynthia E. Irvine, Thuy D. Nguyen, Timothy M. Vidas, and Timothy E. Levin

7. **PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research (CISR)
   1411 Cunningham Road, Monterey, CA 93943

8. **PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER**
   NPS-CS-07-021

9. **SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**
   National Science Foundation (NSF)

10. **SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER**

11. **SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**
    This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF). Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the NSF.

12a. **DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**
    Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

12b. **DISTRIBUTION CODE**

13. **ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words.)**
   A mobile computing device has more inherent risk than desktops or most other stationary computing devices. Such mobile devices are typically carried outside of a controlled physical environment, and they must communicate over an insecure medium. The risk is even greater if the data being stored, processed and transmitted by the mobile device is classified. The purpose of the SecureCore research project is to investigate fundamental architectural features required for the trusted operation of mobile computing devices so the security is built-in, transparent and flexible. A building block for the SecureCore project is a Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK). The LPSK together with extension modules provides the security base. Detailed functional interfaces between the LPSK and extension modules are described, as well as usage scenarios.

14. **SUBJECT TERMS**
   High Assurance, Security Kernel

15. **NUMBER OF PAGES**
    20

16. **PRICE CODE**

17. **SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT**
    Unclassified

18. **SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE**
    Unclassified

19. **SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT**
    Unclassified

20. **LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**
    Unclassified
This page left intentionally blank
SecureCore Software Architecture:
Trusted Management Layer (TML)
Kernel Extension Module Interface Specification

David J. Shifflett, Paul C. Clark, Cynthia E. Irvine, Thuy D. Nguyen, Timothy M. Vidas, Timothy E. Levin

January 29, 2008
Acknowledgements

This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. CNS-0430566 and CNS-0430598 with support from DARPA ATO. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or of DARPA ATO.

Author Affiliation:

Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research
Computer Science Department
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
# Table of Contents

1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1
   1.1 Background ......................................................................................................... 1
2 Core Kernel Interfaces for kernel extension modules .................................................... 1
   2.1 kio_printf ............................................................................................................. 2
   2.2 kio_printf_str ....................................................................................................... 3
   2.3 kio_printf_int ...................................................................................................... 4
   2.4 kio_printf_char .................................................................................................... 5
3 SP Emulation Module Interfaces for LPSK ................................................................. 6
References ........................................................................................................................... 7
1 Introduction

1.1 Background
SecureCore is a research project funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF) to investigate the fundamental architectural features required for trustworthy operation of mobile computing devices such as smart cards, embedded controllers and hand-held computers. The goal is to provide secure processing and communication features for resource-constrained platforms, without compromise of performance, size, cost or energy consumption. In this environment, the security must also be built-in, transparent and flexible.

This document describes the interfaces for kernel extension modules that may be incorporated into the Trusted Management Layer (TML), specifically the Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK). The LPSK is composed of modules which are used as the building blocks of the kernel implementation, these modules are referred to as core kernel modules. Kernel extension modules are separate from the core LPSK modules, providing additional functionality. Included in this document are interfaces that the LPSK provides for the kernel extension modules to call, as well as interfaces the kernel extension modules present for the LPSK to call under certain circumstances.

A description of the software architecture and definitions can be found elsewhere [1]. This document assumes the reader is familiar with the architecture and terminology of the SecureCore project.

2 Core Kernel Interfaces for kernel extension modules
The ‘printf’ interfaces function similar to the C library ‘printf’ call, with the following limitations.

- Only certain escape characters (e.g. \n, \r) are recognized. The allowed escape characters are \r and \n. These escape characters are used in the same manner as the C library ‘printf’ call.
- Only certain format specifiers (e.g. %d, %s) are recognized. The allowed format specifiers are %s, %c, %d, %u, and %x. These format specifiers are used in the same manner as the C library ‘printf’ call.
- It is assumed that string inputs to the ‘printf’ functions will be NULL (‘\0’) terminated and contain only ASCII printable characters.

The LPSK does not support dynamic allocation of memory, therefore there is no ‘malloc’ interface. Memory required by kernel extension modules must be compiled into the kernel extension module, via data declarations, as described in ‘Kernel Extension Module Integration Guide’ [3].
2.1 **kio_printf**
This call is used to display a string to the screen.

2.1.1 **Prototype**

```c
void kio_printf(const char * const buffer);
```

2.1.2 **Inputs**

- `buffer`
The string to be displayed.

2.1.3 **Outputs**

- None

2.1.4 **Effects**

- None

2.1.5 **Errors**

- None
2.2  kio_printf_str
This call is used to display a formatted string to the screen.

2.2.1  Prototype

\[
\text{void kio_printf_str(}
\text{\hspace{1em}}
\text{const char * const format,}
\text{\hspace{1em}}
\text{const char * const buffer);}\]

2.2.2  Inputs

- **format**
  The string containing the format specifier. The format specifier (\%s) will be replaced by the input buffer.

- **buffer**
  The string to be displayed, according to the format specifier.

2.2.3  Outputs

- None

2.2.4  Effects

- None

2.2.5  Errors

- None
2.3 *kio_printf_int*

This call is used to display a formatted number to the screen

2.3.1 Prototype

```c
void kio_printf_int(
    const char * const format,
    const int value);
```

2.3.2 Inputs

- **format**
  The string containing the format specifier. The format specifier (%d, %x, or %u) will be replaced by the string representation of the input value.

- **value**
  The numeric value to be displayed, according to the format specifier.

2.3.3 Outputs

- None

2.3.4 Effects

- None

2.3.5 Errors

- None
2.4  kio_printf_char
This call is used to display a formatted character to the screen.

2.4.1 Prototype
    void kio_printf_char(
        const char * const format,
        const char  value);

2.4.2 Inputs

    • format
      The string containing the format specifier. The format specifier (%c) will be
      replaced by the input character.

    • value
      The character to be displayed, according to the format specifier.

2.4.3 Outputs

    • None

2.4.4 Effects

    • None

2.4.5 Errors

    • None
3 SP Emulation Module Interfaces for LPSK

/* This structure defines the register state passed to the CEMInterrupt calls */
typedef struct {
    unsigned int gs;   /* the GS register */
    unsigned int fs;   /* the FS register */
    unsigned int es;   /* the ES register */
    unsigned int ds;   /* the DS register */
    unsigned int cspl0;  /* the CS register in the interrupt handler */
    unsigned int sspl0;  /* the SS register in the interrupt handler */
    unsigned int edi;  /* the EDI register */
    unsigned int esi;  /* the ESI register */
    unsigned int ebp;  /* the EBP register */
    unsigned int esp;  /* the ESP register */
    unsigned int ebx;  /* the EBX register */
    unsigned int edx;  /* the EDX register */
    unsigned int ecx;  /* the ECX register */
    unsigned int eax;  /* the EAX register */
    /* the interrupt number */
    unsigned int int_num;
    unsigned int error_code; /* the error code that caused the interrupt,
        only supported for interrupts 0x08, 0x0A, - 0x0E, and 0x10,
        all other interrupts have 0 in this field */
    unsigned int eipplx;  /* the IP register at the time of the interrupt */
    unsigned int csplx;  /* the CS register at the time of the interrupt */
    unsigned int eflags;  /* the flags register */
    unsigned int espplx;  /* the ESP register at the time of the interrupt */
    unsigned int ssplx;  /* the SS register at the time of the interrupt */
} registers_struct;

These following interfaces are defined elsewhere. [2]

This function will be called during LPSK initialization.
int SPHW_PowerOn (void *initdata);

This function will be called during LPSK shutdown, or halt.
int SPHW_PowerOff (void *initdata);

This function will be called upon receipt of interrupt number 200 (0xC8).
SPFault SPHW_CEMInterrupt_Suspend ( 
    void *regs, 
    size_t regslen, 
    void *returnip, 
    const unsigned int partitionid,
SecureCore Software Architecture: TML Kernel Extension Module Interface Specification

const unsigned int processid);

This function will be called prior to returning from the handler for interrupt number 200 (0xC8).

SPFault SPHW_CEMInterrupt_Resume ( void *regs,
    size_t regslen,
    void *returnip,
    const unsigned int partitionid,
    const unsigned int processid);

This function will be called after calling an emulated SP instruction to determine if a hardware fault was generated.

    int SPHW_ChecKFault (SPFault fault);

References


Initial Distribution List

1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
   8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944
   Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

2. Dudley Knox Library, Code 013 2
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, CA 93943-5100

3. Research Office, Code 09 1
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, CA 93943-5138

4. Karl Levitt 1
   National Science Foundation
   4201 Wilson Blvd.
   Arlington, VA 22230

5. Lee Badger 1
   DARPA
   3701 Fairfax Drive
   Arlington, VA 22203

6. David J. Shifflett 1
   Code CS
   Department of Computer Science
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, CA 93943-5118

7. Paul C. Clark 1
   Code CS/Cp
   Department of Computer Science
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, CA 93943-5118

8. Cynthia E. Irvine 2
   Code CS/Ic
   Department of Computer Science
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, CA 93943-5118
9. Timothy E. Levin  
   Code CS/Tl  
   Department of Computer Science  
   Naval Postgraduate School  
   Monterey, CA 93943-5118

10. Thuy D. Nguyen  
    Code CS/Tn  
    Department of Computer Science  
    Naval Postgraduate School  
    Monterey, CA 93943-5118

11. Timothy M. Vidas  
    Code CS  
    Department of Computer Science  
    Naval Postgraduate School  
    Monterey, CA 93943-5118