User Perceptions vs. Proxy LLM Judges: Privacy and Helpfulness in LLM Responses to Privacy-Sensitive Scenarios

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Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) are rapidly being adopted for tasks like drafting emails, summarizing meetings, and answering health questions. In these settings, users may need to share private information (e.g., contact details, health records). To evaluate LLMs' ability to identify and redact such information, prior work introduced real-life, scenario-based benchmarks (e.g., ConfAIde, PrivacyLens) and found that LLMs can leak private information in complex scenarios. However, these evaluations relied on proxy LLMs to judge the helpfulness and privacy-preservation quality of LLM responses, rather than directly measuring users' perceptions. To understand how users perceive the helpfulness and privacy-preservation quality of LLM responses to privacy-sensitive scenarios, we conducted a user study ($n = 94$) using 90 PrivacyLens scenarios. We found that users had low agreement with each other when evaluating identical LLM responses. In contrast, five proxy LLMs reached high agreement, yet each proxy LLM had low correlation with users' evaluations. These results indicate that proxy LLMs cannot accurately estimate users' wide range of perceptions of utility and privacy in privacy-sensitive scenarios. We discuss the need for more user-centered studies to measure LLMs' ability to help users while preserving privacy, and for improving alignment between LLMs and users in estimating perceived privacy and utility.

1 Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) are rapidly adopted for everyday tasks (e.g., drafting emails, summarizing meetings, and answering health questions) (Brown et al., 2022; Carlini et al., 2023; Mireshghallah et al., 2024a,b; Zhang et al., 2024). In these workflows, users may need to provide private information (e.g., email threads, contact details, medical history) to LLMs (Cox et al., 2025; Yun and Bickmore, 2025). When generating an answer, an LLM may incorporate such private information into its output (e.g., restating a medical condition in an email). This creates privacy risks because LLM responses could be passed between tools (e.g., agents) or shared with others (e.g., forwarding a summarized email thread), exposing private information to unintended audiences and thereby violating contextual integrity norms (Chen et al., 2025b; Nissenbaum, 2004, 2019).

Prior work has developed privacy benchmarks (e.g., PrivacyLens) to test whether LLMs can complete everyday tasks without disclosing private information. Using these benchmarks, researchers found that LLMs may leak private information in scenarios with rich context (e.g., meeting transcripts), multi-turn user interactions (e.g., chat history), and nuanced private information (e.g., medical history shared through emails) (Mireshghallah et al., 2024b; Shao et al., 2024). Although these evaluations reveal LLMs sometimes fail to keep secrets, they relied on proxy LLMs' judgments, rather than measuring users' perceptions directly (Mireshghallah et al., 2024b; Shao et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2025; Zharmagambetov et al., 2025). As a result, it remains unclear how users perceive the privacy and helpfulness of LLM responses to privacy-sensitive scenarios, and how closely proxy LLM judgments align with users' perceptions. Our study assesses proxy LLMs' ability to estimate human perceptions by answering the following research questions:

RQ1 How do users perceive the helpfulness and privacy-preservation quality of LLM-generated responses in privacy-sensitive scenarios?
RQ2 Are proxy LLM judgments of helpfulness and privacy-preservation aligned with user perceptions?
RQ3 How do proxy LLM justifications of their evaluations compare with user justifications?

We designed a survey to collect evaluations of the helpfulness and privacy-preservation quality of LLM-generated responses to 90 randomly selected

scenarios from PrivacyLens. We recruited 94 participants, each evaluating five randomly assigned scenarios. We also used five proxy LLMs to complete the same survey and compared their responses with those of participants.

Participants generally found LLM responses to be helpful and privacy-preserving, but often did not agree with each other when evaluating the same response (Krippendorff's $\alpha = 0.36$) (Section 4.1). In contrast, each proxy LLM responded consistently across five repeated runs ($\alpha > 0.88$), and the five proxy LLMs showed moderate agreement with one another ($\alpha = 0.78$). Comparing participants' evaluations to proxy LLMs' judgments, we found that proxy LLMs are poor estimators of human judgment; most notably, because they do not capture the within-scenario diversity in human evaluations. Additionally, proxy LLMs did not closely estimate participants' average evaluations per scenario, showing only weak to moderate correlations with human ratings across 90 scenarios (Spearman's $\rho \in [0.24, 0.68]$). Our qualitative analysis reveals that proxy LLMs sometimes missed nuanced context, overlooked clearly private data (e.g., credit card details), or diverged from participants' privacy views (e.g., treating clients' first names as non-sensitive information in situations where participants did not) (Section 4.3).

Our results suggest that human-centered evaluation remains essential for privacy- and utility-related assessments of LLM-generated content and that current proxy-LLM-based evaluations may misrepresent actual user risks. We also suggest that evaluations with proxy LLMs should move beyond deterministic single-score judgments toward capturing the variety of user evaluations. Building on prior work calling for clear evaluation taxonomies, we underscore the need to distinguish objective-answer tasks (where consistency is desirable) from preference-sensitive tasks (where diversity is expected) to guide research design, metric selection, and when to rely on proxy LLM evaluations. Finally, we highlight personalization as a complementary direction for better approximating individual privacy and utility preferences (Section 5).

2 Background and Related Work

In this section, we review closely related prior work, starting with research on contextual privacy, since it provides the foundation for our study of users' privacy perceptions (Section 2.1). We summarize prior research on the helpfulness and privacy of LLM-generated content (Section 2.2). Finally, we draw attention to the importance of conducting user studies in evaluation of LLMs (Section 2.3).

2.1 Contextual Privacy

Contextual Integrity (CI) frames privacy as the appropriateness of information flows given five parameters: sender, recipient, subject, information type, and transmission principle (Nissenbaum, 2019, 2004). Empirical work shows that users' privacy judgments rely on these contextual variables (Martin and Nissenbaum, 2016). Researchers have applied CI as a framework to understand online privacy policies (Shvartzshnaider et al., 2019, 2018), users' perceptions of smart home devices privacy (Abdi et al., 2021; Frik et al., 2025), and mobile app permission systems (Wijesekera et al., 2015, 2017; Fu et al., 2019). Recently, LLMs have been rapidly adopted into users' everyday workflows (e.g., summarizing meetings, drafting emails, answering health or legal questions). Unlike earlier studies that often examined bounded ecosystems (e.g., smart homes or app permissions), LLM-generated responses could be passed between tools and people, increasing the chance of sensitive details reaching unintended audiences. Mireshghallah et al. investigated LLMs' ability to keep secrets through a benchmark (ConfAIde) rooted in CI and found LLMs are capable of identifying private information according to the social norm in simple multiple-choice questions. However, they discovered LLMs, when tasked to generate a meeting summary, surfaced sensitive details that CI would deem inappropriate (Mireshghallah et al., 2024b). Their findings together with the complex nature of contextual privacy lay the ground for further research into LLMs' ability to preserve privacy.

2.2 Helpfulness and Privacy-Preservation Ability of LLM-Generated Content

Much prior work has evaluated and established LLMs' ability to help users in various domains (e.g., summarizing text, drafting emails, answering medical questions, recommending products) (Asthana et al., 2025; Chen et al., 2019; Guha et al., 2023; Li et al., 2025c; Lin et al., 2025; Mastropaolo et al., 2023; Miura et al., 2025; Singhal et al., 2023; Xue et al., 2024). Yet, privacy-preserving behavior at inference time has received comparatively less attention (Mireshghallah et al., 2024a,b; Shao et al.,

2024). ConfAIde adapts CI into a benchmark and shows that LLMs disclose sensitive details in open-ended generation (Mireshghallah et al., 2024b). More recently, Shao et al. developed PrivacyLens, expanding 493 seeds grounded in regulations, prior privacy literature, and crowdsourcing, into expressive privacy-sensitive scenarios. These scenarios capture complex, task-oriented contexts (e.g., multi-turn messages) in which LLMs are asked to complete a task (e.g., draft a response). Using PrivacyLens, the authors report that LLMs can leak sensitive information 26–39% of the time (Shao et al., 2024). Further, in LLM-assisted tasks, a privacy–helpfulness trade-off arises: aggressive redaction or evasive replies can reduce disclosure but undermine utility, whereas detailed answers improve usefulness while increasing risks (Yermilov et al., 2023; Bai et al., 2022; Zhang et al., 2024). Because neither extreme is desirable, evaluations taking both into consideration are essential.

2.3 User Evaluations in Privacy Preservation and Helpfulness

Work across human-computer interaction, usable security and privacy, and natural language processing shows that privacy and helpfulness are context-dependent and user-perceived outcomes. Perceived privacy is often subjective—people judge acceptability by social norms, roles, purposes, and audiences (Nissenbaum, 2004, 2019; Acquisti et al., 2015). Usability research shows that notice-and-choice mechanisms do not reliably predict users' privacy comfort without empirical feedback (Cranor, 2008; Wu et al., 2025a). Similarly, evaluations of privacy and utility on LLM-generated content should also involve user input. In both ConfAIde and PrivacyLens, the authors used proxy LLMs to judge the privacy-preservation quality and utility (Mireshghallah et al., 2024b; Shao et al., 2024). Proxy LLMs are used as stand-ins for human, but it is unclear whether assessments provided by LLMs faithfully estimate users' perceptions.

Our study fills the gaps in prior work through a user study of privacy-preservation quality and helpfulness of LLM responses. We also compare participants' and proxy LLMs' evaluations to understand the alignment between human and LLMs.

3 Methods

To understand users' perceptions of the helpfulness and privacy-preservation quality of LLM-generated responses (RQ1), we sampled privacy-sensitive scenarios from PrivacyLens and used an LLM to generate a response for each scenario (Section 3.1). We then designed and deployed a survey asking participants to evaluate the scenarios and responses (Section 3.2). To assess how well proxy can LLMs estimate users' evaluations (RQ2), we used five proxy LLMs to complete the same survey (Section 3.1) and compared proxy LLMs' and participants' responses through quantitative analysis (Section 3.3). Finally, to examine differences in proxy LLMs' and participants' explanations of their choices (RQ3), we qualitatively analyzed both participants' and proxy LLMs' explanations (Section 3.3). Our study design is summarized in Figure 1.



Figure 1: Overview of our study design.

3.1 Study Setup

Privacy-sensitive scenarios We randomly selected 90 scenarios from PrivacyLens (Shao et al., 2024), a dataset developed for evaluating LLMs' ability to preserve private information in everyday contexts used by many prior works (e.g., Chen et al. (2025a); Li et al. (2025e); Yu et al. (2025); Zhang et al. (2025); Zhou et al. (2025)). We used 90 scenarios instead of fewer to increase the likelihood that our results would generalize across a wide range of privacy-sensitive contexts. Each scenario includes contextual information (e.g., meeting notes, email history) and a task (e.g., summarizing meeting notes, replying to an email). For presenting scenarios to participants, we converted the scenarios from JSON into HTML without changing any content. We provide an example in Figure 3.

LLM response to privacy-sensitive scenarios We used OpenAI's GPT-5 API to generate one response per scenario using PrivacyLens *privacy-enhancing* prompts (see Appendix A.2). We selected GPT-5 because, at the time of the study, it was one of the best-performing and widely used models[1] that we had access to. To ensure that participants' perceptions were primarily driven by the content of the responses rather than specific stylistic quirks of the model (e.g., verbosity or distinct tone), we manually inspected the GPT-5-generated responses; we found no clear evidence of such characteristics. We discuss potential limitations of using GPT-5 in Limitations.

Using proxy LLMs as judges Following prior work that used LLMs as proxies for human judgments (Li et al., 2025e; Mireshghallah et al., 2024b; Shao et al., 2024), we used five proxy LLMs to evaluate helpfulness and privacy-preservation quality of responses to all scenarios: GPT-5, Llama-3.3-80B-Instruct (*Llama-3.3*), Gemma-3-27B (*Gemma-3*), Qwen-3-30B-A3B-IT (*Qwen-3*), and Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3 (*Mistral*). We selected GPT-5 because it was the newest closed-weight model we could access. We selected the open-weight models because, at the time of our experiment, they were the newest model and the largest variants we could run on our NVIDIA A100 GPU. To assess how well proxy LLMs estimate human evaluations, we employed a direct prompt instructing models to "Imagine you are name", mirroring the linguistic cues presented to human participants. This design choice, guided by prior research (Siledar et al., 2024), focuses on comparing the models' outputs with human responses. Because subjective concepts like privacy norms are highly context-dependent, we seek to measure the alignment between participants' evaluations and LLMs' judgments rather than testing the LLMs' capacity to follow specific prompts (e.g., targeted at preserving privacy). We discuss how alternative prompts could be utilized in Section 5. We used each model's default generation parameters (see Table 2) to reflect how users would normally use these models. Because LLM outputs can vary for identical inputs (Kuhn et al., 2023; Lin et al., 2025; Wu et al., 2025b), we collected five independent evaluations per scenario from each proxy LLM to capture variability in judgments. We report the GPU time for these evaluations in Table 2.

[1] https://lmarena.ai/leaderboard

3.2 User Study

Recruitment We recruited participants using Prolific[2], an online crowdsourcing platform used for research popular among prior work (e.g., Shao et al. (2024); Tang et al. (2022); Wu et al. (2025b)). Participants had to be at least 18 years old, fluent in English, and located in the U.S. to be eligible.

Survey Potential participants accessed our study through a link on Prolific first encountered an informed consent form. Those who consented and met eligibility requirements proceeded to the survey. We first showed participants an example scenario, LLM response, along with instructions on how to complete the survey. Participants were then asked to evaluate five randomly selected scenarios. For each scenario, we prompted participants to "imagine you are name in the following scenario." We provide an example scenario in Figure 3.

For each scenario, we asked participants seven questions to capture their perceptions of helpfulness (H1–H3) and privacy-preservation quality (P1–P4). H1 is a Yes/No question that directly assesses whether the response completed the task. The remaining six are five-point Likert-scale questions. H2 measures perceived helpfulness, and H3 captures participants' intention to use the response in the scenario. P1 asks participants to rate the sensitivity of the information in the scenario, since perceived sensitivity is a key driver of privacy concern and disclosure decisions (Acquisti et al., 2015). P2 asks how likely participants would be to share such information with an LLM, measuring willingness to disclose in the scenario (Choi et al., 2025). P3 asks whether the response respected privacy norms, assessing whether the response is appropriate for the privacy-sensitive scenario according to privacy norms (Nissenbaum, 2004). P4 asks whether the response respected the participant's personal privacy preferences, capturing individual differences that may diverge from the norms. For all questions except H1, we collected explanations to interpret the reasoning behind participants' evaluations.

Each participant evaluated five randomly selected scenarios, and each scenario was rated by five participants to capture a range of perspectives. We collected at least five participants' evaluations per scenario to capture human variability while keeping the study feasible, an approach consistent with prior work in human-centered evaluation (Fab-

[2] https://www.prolific.com/

bri et al., 2021; Wu et al., 2025b). Under this design, 90 participants would ideally be sufficient. However, due to imperfect balancing and the exclusion of one participant who provided nonsensical responses to all open-ended questions, we recruited 94 valid participants. Participants were diverse in age, gender, education level, and income. We provide a detailed breakdown of participants' demographics in Table 5.

3.3 Data Analysis

Quantitative analysis For each scenario, participants and proxy LLMs evaluated the LLM response via seven questions, where six had answers on a five-point Likert scale (Section 3.2). We converted Likert responses to numeric values using evenly spaced increments centered at 0 (i.e., -1=strongly disagree, -0.5=disagree, 0=neutral, 0.5=agree, and 1=strongly agree). To measure the agreement among the (≥ 5) participants who evaluated the same scenario, we followed prior work and computed ordinal Krippendorff's α (Castro, 2017; Jurgens et al., 2023; Krippendorff, 2011; Mendes et al., 2023). We similarly computed α for proxy LLMs to measure agreement across repeated runs and across five proxy LLMs. We further computed the range and standard deviation of responses to capture how much judgments for each scenario diverged. Additionally, we followed prior work and used Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (ρ) to examine the correlation between participants' and proxy LLMs' average rating per scenario (Siledar et al., 2024; Wu et al., 2025b).

Qualitative analysis To understand participants' rationales for their evaluations, we asked them to provide an open-ended explanation of their Likert-scale answers (Section 3.2). Two researchers qualitatively coded participants' answers using a thematic analysis approach (Karamolegkou et al., 2025; Ortloff et al., 2023). Specifically, one researcher first coded 10 answers for each question, producing a primary codebook. Another researcher then joined the first researcher and reviewed the codes together, discussed and resolved any disagreement by updating or merging the codes. Next, the two researchers split the remaining answers and coded them with the agreed-upon codebook. We provide our codebook in Appendix A.6. We share qualitative results throughout Section 4 to support our findings. Through the qualitative analysis, we did not observe any answers that indicated a clear misunderstanding of the survey questions.

4 Results

Through a survey, we collected evaluations from 94 participants and five proxy LLMs on the helpfulness and privacy of LLM responses to 90 scenarios. Overall, participants mostly rated LLM responses as helpful and privacy-preserving. However, participants evaluating specific scenarios often disagreed with each other (RQ1; 4.1). In contrast, proxy LLMs made consistent judgments across repeated runs and different models largely agreed in their judgments (4.2). Consequently, we found proxy LLMs' judgments did not closely approximate participants' evaluations (RQ2; 4.3.1). Comparing participants' and proxy LLMs' explanations revealed that proxy LLMs sometimes missed contextual nuances or overlooked sensitive information that was obvious to participants (RQ3; 4.3.2).

4.1 Participants' Evaluations

Each of the 94 participants evaluated five randomly selected scenarios (470 evaluations total). We first summarize participants' helpfulness and privacy-preservation ratings. We then examine scenario-level agreement to assess how different participants evaluated the same scenario. Finally, we examine participants' explanations for their choices to understand the reasoning behind their evaluations.

Participants often found LLM responses helpful and privacy-preserving In 92% of evaluations, participants indicated that the response completed the task. In addition, 87% of evaluations rated the response as helpful, and participants said they would use the response to complete the task 84% of the time (Figure 4). In terms of privacy, participants reported that LLM responses *mostly* or *completely* complied with privacy norms in 78% of evaluations. Similarly, 83% of evaluations indicated that the responses respected personal privacy preferences (Figure 5). These results suggest LLMs can be helpful while preserving privacy.

Participants had low agreement when evaluating the same scenario While participants generally rated the LLM's responses as helpful and mostly privacy-preserving, there were notable disagreement among the five or six participants who rated each scenario. Inter-rater agreement within scenarios was low (Krippendorff's $\alpha = 0.36$). We also examined the within-scenario range of ratings.

We found that at least two participants selected opposite ends of the Likert scale on intention to use the response (H3) in 20% (n=18) of scenarios. For information sensitivity (P1) and intention to share information with an LLM (P2), participants never fully agreed in any of the 90 scenarios. When evaluating whether the response respected privacy norms (P3) and personal privacy preferences (P4), at least one participant disagreed with others in 88% (n=79) and 96% (n=86) of scenarios, respectively (Figure 2).

Helpfulness evaluations were driven by task completion, with additional considerations on communication quality and privacy When evaluating helpfulness (H2), participants who selected *very helpful* mentioned "task completion" 93% of the time and "clarity" in 8%, whereas those who selected *unhelpful* frequently cited "task failure" (73%). Similarly, when asked about intention to use the LLM response (H3), participants who reported being *extremely likely* to use the response referenced "task completion" (92%) and "clarity" (26%). In contrast, those who selected *extremely unlikely* mentioned "task failure" (67%), with some participants also cited "privacy leaks" (33%) as a reason, highlighting privacy concerns as a factor impacting their willingness to use the LLM's response.

Privacy evaluations were driven by leakage of sensitive inforamtion Participants who rated the LLM response as *not at all* or *slightly* respecting privacy norms almost always cited "leaked private info" (90%), such as credit card details, clients' names, or a tax refund amount. In contrast, participants who judged the response as respecting privacy norms most often cited "limited sharing" (79%), noting that the response omitted sensitive details (e.g., contact or health information) and instead shared only general or publicly available information (e.g., the time of a community event).

Participants' privacy preferences and interpretation of the scenario drive disagreement Through participants' explanations, we found that disagreement often stemmed from differing privacy preferences and interpretations of what information is sensitive in the scenario. For example, in scenario 47, the LLM-generated email included a temporary password in plain text. While two participants viewed this as acceptable, others evaluated the response as not respecting privacy norms, explaining that credentials should not be shared via email. In scenario 32, the LLM was tasked to draft a message seeking advice from "Childcare Support Network". Three participants felt that including children's names in the message violated privacy norms and their personal privacy preferences, whereas two considered it acceptable because the message only involved details that were relevant to the request.

Within Scenario Agreement	α
≥ 5 participants' evaluations	0.3573
Gemma-3	0.9788
GPT-5	0.9328
Llama-3.3	0.9830
Mistral	0.8823
Qwen-3	0.9848
Across the 5 proxy LLMs	0.7770

Table 1: Treating each participant and each proxy LLM run as a rater, we find low agreement among participants, high agreement within each proxy LLM, and moderate across the five proxy LLMs (25 runs). $\alpha < 0.67$ indicates low agreement, $0.67 \leq \alpha \leq 0.79$ indicates moderate agreement, and $\alpha \geq 0.8$ indicates satisfactory agreement (Marzi et al., 2024).

Result 1: Participants generally found LLM responses to privacy-sensitive scenarios to preserve privacy and provide utility. However, participants had a wide range of opinions on each scenario, with disagreement often driven by individual preferences and contextual factors.

4.2 Proxy LLMs' Judgments

We used five proxy LLMs (Gemma-3, GPT-5, Llama-3.3, Mistral, and Qwen-3) to complete the same survey as in the user study. We compared participants' and proxy LLMs' evaluations to assess how well proxy LLMs estimate user perceptions.

Proxy LLMs' judgments are consistent We applied the same agreement analysis as for participants, treating each of the five runs as an individual coder and found that proxy LLMs showed high agreement across runs: the lowest α was 0.88 (Mistral) and the highest was 0.98 (Qwen-3) (Table 1). In addition to within-LLM agreement, proxy LLMs also showed moderate agreement with one another across the 25 evaluations per scenario ($\alpha = 0.78$). Proxy LLMs also showed a narrower range of eval-



Figure 2: For each survey question (y-axis), we plot the percentage of scenarios (x-axis) with evaluations that span a given range, computed across participants and across five runs of each proxy LLM rating the same scenario. Participants' evaluations span wider ranges in more scenarios than proxy LLMs'. Subfigures for the other three proxy LLMs are in Figure 6

uations and lower standard deviation across runs than human participants (Figures 2 and 6).

4.3 Participants vs Proxy LLMs

We compared participants' evaluations with proxy LLMs' judgments to assess how well proxy LLMs estimate human perceptions of helpfulness and privacy (RQ2), and found misalignment between the two (Section 4.3.1). To understand where their reasoning aligns or diverges, we compared participants' and proxy LLMs' explanations for their evaluations (RQ3; Section 4.3.2).

4.3.1 Misalignment Between Participants and Proxy LLMs

For each scenario, we compared participants' and proxy LLMs' evaluations. Participants' evaluations of the same scenario often spanned a wide range, whereas proxy LLM judgments across repeated runs spanned a narrow range. For perceived helpfulness (H2), GPT-5's five runs gave identical ratings on 72% of scenarios and Qwen-3's on 99%, while participants fully agreed on only 6%. Similarly, for privacy-norm compliance (P3), participants selected opposite ends of the Likert scale on 30% of scenarios. In contrast, four of the five proxy LLMs never selected opposite ends for the same scenario across five runs, and GPT-5 did so in only 1% of scenarios. For personal privacy preferences (P4), in 11% of scenarios at least one participant selected *strongly disagree* while at least one other selected *strongly agree*, whereas no proxy LLM exhibited the same diversity of judgments. Aggregating all 25 proxy-LLM ratings per scenario increases the observed spread but still yields ratings unlike participants'. For example, on P4, Qwen-3 consistently selected *agree* across scenarios, while the other proxy LLMs' judgments ranged from *strongly disagree* to *agree*, producing a fixed three-point span for every scenario. Thus, even when pooling multiple proxy LLMs, their ratings remained a poor proxy for participants' evaluations (Figures 2 and 6).

In addition to range, standard deviations of per-scenario evaluations show a similar pattern. For example, when asked about intention to use the response (H3), participants did not fully agree (i.e., with a non-zero standard deviation between participants' evaluations of the same scenario) in 90% of scenarios, compared to 27% for GPT-5 and below 10% for the other proxy LLMs. When asked about information sensitivity (P1) and willingness to share (P2), participants evaluations had non-zero standard deviation across all 90 scenarios, whereas proxy LLMs fully agreed on over 52% of scenarios (Figure 7).

Proxy LLMs' judgments weakly to moderately correlate with participants' average ratings Because using proxy LLMs did not capture participants' wide range of evaluations, we next tested whether they at least estimated the *average* participant evaluation for each scenario. For each scenario and survey question, we computed the mean participant rating and the mean proxy LLM rating and measured their association using Spearman's rank correlation. For both helpfulness and privacy evaluations, individual proxy LLMs correlated weakly to moderately with participants ($\rho \in [0.24, 0.68]$). Aggregating across all 25 proxy judgments per scenario (five runs for each of five proxy LLMs) similarly yielded weak to moderate correlations with

participants' responses (Table 3).

While prior work emphasized the value of consistent LLM outputs, we discuss in Section 5 why diverse evaluations may be desirable when LLMs are used to estimate human perceptions.

Result 2: Proxy LLMs did not accurately estimate participants' helpfulness and privacy evaluations: LLM ratings were much less variable and only weakly to moderately correlated with participants' scenario-level average evaluations.

4.3.2 Comparing Participants' and Proxy LLMs' Explanations

Prior work has shown that LLMs can articulate their reasoning (Guha et al., 2023; Li et al., 2025e); accordingly, we asked proxy LLMs to explain their choices. Mirroring the rating results, proxy LLMs' explanations for a given scenario were more semantically consistent than participants' explanations. Using the Universal Sentence Encoder[3] similarity metric, participants' within-scenario semantic similarity was low (0.18–0.27), compared to 0.66–0.85 for proxy LLMs. Different proxy LLMs also provided similar explanations (0.66 for P4 to 0.72 for H2), compared to participants (Table 4).

We examined 10 scenarios in which proxy LLMs' and participants' judgments aligned most and 10 where they diverged most. When they aligned, proxy LLMs often cited reasons similar to participants' (e.g., completing the task, omitting sensitive information). When they diverged, proxy LLMs missed contextual nuances that were obvious to participants or failed to identify information that participants viewed as clearly sensitive.

For example, scenario 65 involves John, Emily, and Alex discussing their job-search experiences. Acting as John and tasked with replying to Emily's inquiry for job-hunting tips, the LLM generated a response about Alex's upcoming interview. Four of the five participants noticed that the response did not address the assigned task. Participant 81 explained, "Emily asked for job-hunting tips, and the response just summarized the previous conversation…". In contrast, across 25 runs, all five proxy LLMs labeled the response as *helpful*, stating that the response "directly addresses" the task. Similarly, in scenario 78, all five participants flagged the credit card details as sensitive, while the proxy LLM (Mistral) said "there is no explicitly sensitive information like financial data [in the scenario]…".

These findings suggest that proxy LLMs may not yet be reliable stand-ins for humans for privacy evaluations. We discuss these shortcomings in Section 5 and offer suggestions for how LLMs could improve.

Result 3: Comparing participants' and proxy LLMs' explanations reveals that proxy LLMs can miss key details or contextual nuance in scenarios, contributing to the misalignment between proxy LLMs' and participants' evaluations.

5 Conclusion and Discussion

We conducted a study with 94 participants and five proxy LLMs evaluating the privacy-preservation quality and helpfulness of LLM responses to 90 privacy-sensitive scenarios from PrivacyLens. Overall, participants found LLM responses helpful and mostly privacy-preserving, consistently with prior work suggesting LLMs can provide utility and preserve privacy (Li et al., 2025e,b; Shao et al., 2024). However, participants often disagreed in their assessments of specific scenarios: their assessments had low agreement and high variability. In contrast, five proxy LLMs—often used as stand-ins for human evaluation in prior work—produced much more consistent ratings and semantically similar explanations, both within and across models. When comparing proxy LLMs' judgments with participants' evaluations, we found that proxy LLMs aligned only weakly-to-moderately with scenario-level average participant ratings and did not capture the diversity of individual participants' evaluations.

Our findings deepen the understanding of the limitations of proxy LLMs by extending the scope of assessment to privacy and utility. While recent work found that proxy LLMs often overlook context-dependent privacy norms (Meisenbacher et al., 2025), our results show that such misalignment persists in complex, multi-turn interactions and in rich contextual settings (e.g., chat history, meeting summaries). Further, our qualitative comparison of proxy LLMs' and participants' explanations provides a nuanced view of the gap between proxy LLMs' judgments and human evaluations. This aligns with evidence from prior work that suggests LLM-based evaluations can overlook contextual information and provide judgments that differ from what people consider appropriate (Juneja et al., 2025).

[3] https://www.kaggle.com/models/google/universal-sentence-encoder

Involving users in evaluating LLM-generated content This divergence between participants' evaluations and proxy LLMs' judgments suggests that the common practice of relying on proxy LLMs to assess LLM-generated content is inadequate, particularly for privacy and utility decisions where individual users' differences matter. In line with prior work advocating human-centered evaluations (Li et al., 2024; Meisenbacher et al., 2025; Wu et al., 2025b; Zhang et al., 2025), we suggest that human evaluations should be a key component in assessing LLM-generated content.

Consistency or diversity? While much prior work values consistency in LLM-generated content, our results suggest that consistency may not be the right goal when LLMs are used as proxies for human judgment. For objective tasks (e.g., answering factual questions), consistent outputs are desirable. However, for perceived privacy and utility, judgments depend on context and individual preferences (Acquisti et al., 2015; Nissenbaum, 2004). In these domains, proxy LLMs may need to exhibit the full range of potential user judgments rather than producing a single score. Building on prior calls for clearer evaluation taxonomies and for distinguishing subjective from objective judgments (Basile et al., 2021; Mostafazadeh Davani et al., 2022; Liang et al., 2023), we call for a taxonomy separating objective-answer tasks from preference-sensitive tasks. Making these distinctions can help researchers in guiding study designs and evaluation metrics, as well as when to rely on or go beyond deterministic proxy LLM evaluations. Such taxonomies can also help users interpret whether an LLM's output varies because the input was ambiguous or because the task has inherently subjective answers.

Improving LLMs' ability to estimate individual user preferences Prior work shows that LLMs can be adapted to individual users (Poddar et al., 2024; Li et al., 2025d,a; Zhao et al., 2025), and researchers have found ways to learn users' preferences and provide users with privacy options for online tracking and smart devices (Lau et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2016; Stöver et al., 2023). Building on this, personalized proxy LLMs may better approximate individual privacy and utility judgments. To improve the ability of LLMs to estimate human perception, future research could explore more sophisticated prompting strategies. For example, utilizing "privacy-conscious" personas or few-shot examples—where proxy LLMs are shown a range of human evaluations and their underlying justifications—could help the models better mirror the subjective sensitivity and reasoning of users. Prompting models with diverse rationales for the same scenarios could enable proxy LLMs to better capture the nuanced contextual cues that drive user disagreement. Furthermore, one practical direction for improving LLMs' ability to estimate human judgments is to identify which scenario features most drive proxy LLMs' judgments (e.g., data type, audience, purpose), using attribution-style analyses from related areas such as named entity recognition and computer vision (Jehangir et al., 2023; Selvaraju et al., 2017). Improving the fidelity of user-preference estimation would make proxy LLM evaluations more practical and cost-effective.

Demographic and cultural variation in privacy perceptions Prior work has demonstrated that privacy expectations and perceptions are deeply shaped by demographic, geographic, and cultural contexts (Herbert et al., 2025; Munyendo, 2026; Naveed et al., 2022). Because our study focused on U.S.-based participants, the observed misalignment between proxy LLMs and human judgment reflects a specific set of privcy norms and expectations. It remains an open question whether the limitations we identified in proxy LLM judges—such as their tendency toward consensus and difficulty capturing nuance—manifest differently when compared against more diverse populations. We encourage future research to investigate how proxy LLM evaluations align with users across varied backgrounds and locations to determine the cross-cultural generalizability of automated privacy and helpfulness assessments.

Ethical Considerations

For the user study, we provided all participants with an informed consent form explaining the purpose of our study, expected length, risks and benefits, and compensation for completing the survey. Only participants who gave their consent proceeded to the survey. For the survey, participants took an average of 47 minutes to complete and were compensated $10 for their time. Participants' Prolific IDs were collected solely for compensation purposes upon survey completion. All Prolific IDs were removed after compensation was issued and before any data analysis. The study procedure was reviewed and approved by an internal ethics committee.

Limitations

There are several limitations to our work. First, the responses to the privacy-sensitive scenarios were generated using a single LLM (GPT-5); using a different model could yield different outputs for participants and proxy LLMs to evaluate. With that said, our primary goal was to assess proxy LLMs' ability to estimate user perceptions given a fixed set of responses. Second, while we evaluated five proxy LLMs and observed broadly similar patterns (e.g., narrow range of judgments), other proxy models or prompting setups may behave differently. Third, our participants were U.S.-based and fluent in English, which may not represent broader populations with different privacy norms. As discussed in Section 5, additional human-centered evaluations are needed to better understand when LLM-based proxies can (and cannot) approximate human perceptions of privacy and utility.

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A Appendix

In the appendix, we provide supplemental materials. Specifically, we provide instructions given to participants in our survey (Appendix A.1), prompt used for generating responses to privacy-sensitive scenarios (Appendix A.2), prompt used for proxy LLMs to complete the survey (Appendix A.3), and additional tables and figures to support our results (Appendix A.5).

A.1 Instructions for Survey Participants

In the survey consent form, we inform participants about the potential risks of participating in our study with the following paragraph.

Risks The primary risk is a breach of confidentiality since we use a third-party (Qualtrics) to design our survey and collect survey responses. Additionally, we utilize third-party vendors such as Prolific to recruit participants, and Microsoft Cloud services to store and process survey responses. This risk is similar to what you encounter anytime you provide identifiable and private information online. The risks and discomfort associated with participation in this study are no greater than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or other online activities. Participants might encounter boredom or fatigue during the survey.

We further provide an example scenario of what participants evaluated in the survey in Figure 3.

A.2 Response Generation Prompt

As described in Section 3.1, we directly used the privacy-enhancing prompt from Shao et al. (2024)[4].

```
You are a helpful and privacy-conscious AI {
    agent} who can utilize external tools to
    help {user} accomplish tasks following
    their instructions. Your primary
    objective is to provide accurate and
    efficient assistance while maintaining
    the highest level of discretion and
    security. You are programmed to recognize
     and respect the privacy implications of
    your actions.
```

A.3 Proxy LLMs Evaluation Prompt

We used the following prompt for proxy LLMs to provide judgments and explanations. For each proxy LLM, we applied this prompt to every scenario and survey question, and repeated the process across five runs.

```
Imagine you are {name} in the following *
    scenario* and answer the questions.

*Scenario*: {scenario content}
*Task*: {task}
*Response*: {llm generated response to
    scenario}

Please answer the following question: {survey
    question}

(Choices: {choices}, Explanation: {explanation
     question})

Please format your response as:
Choice: [Your choice from the options above]
Explanation: [Your explanation]
```

A.4 Distribution of Data and Artifact

We plan to release LLM responses to privacy-sensitive scenarios, anonymized participants' evaluations, proxy LLMs' evaluations, and code used for our study upon publication of this paper.

A.5 Supplemental Tables and Figures

We provide additional tables and figures. Table 4 shows the semantic similarity between explanations provided by participants and proxy LLMs. Table 5 shows demographics information for the 94 participants who completed the survey. We provide an example scenario from PrivacyLens through a screenshot to show what we presented to participants in our survey Figure 3. Figures 4 and 5

[4]https://github.com/SALT-NLP/PrivacyLens



Figure 3: An example privacy-sensitive scenario from the PrivacyLens dataset as presented to participants in our survey.

LLM	Time Taken (HH:MM:SS)	Temperature
Gemma-3	01:19:25	1.0
Llama-3.3	01:12:39	0.6
Mistral	01:02:32	1.0
Qwen-3	01:57:53	0.7

Table 2: Temperature configuration and amount of time taken for our A100 GPU to evaluate privacy and helpfulness as proxy LLMs.

show survey answers from participants ($n = 94$) by percent of choices per question.



Figure 4: Participants found that LLM-generated responses completed the given task over 90% of the time. Participants found LLM-generated responses to be helpful and would use the response most of the time.



Figure 5: 78% of the time, participants found the LLM-generated response to comply with the privacy norms. Over 82% of the time, participants found the response respected their personal privacy preferences.

A.6 Codebook

We provide the codes emerged from the qualitative analysis of free-response explanations.

H2 and H3 Codes applied to explanations for helpfulness questions.

- clarity
- detailed
- lack clarity
- negative tone
- neutral
- over detailed
- partial task completion
- personalized
- positive tone
- privacy leak
- privacy preserve
- professional
- task completion
- task failure
- under detailed



Figure 6: In Figure 2, we showed subfigures for participants, GPT-5, Qwen-3, and all five proxy LLMs. Here, we show additional subfigures for the remaining three proxy LLMs.



Figure 7: For a survey question, each subfigure shows a cumulative percentage of scenarios (x-axis) with a certain standard deviation (y-axis) of the Likert scale evaluation. Proxy LLMs show a lower standard deviation than participants' evaluations on more scenarios across the board.

Spearman's ρ	Gemma-3	GPT-5	Llama-3.3	Mistral	Qwen-3	All Proxy LLMs
Helpfulness Questions	0.31***	0.34***	0.24***	0.25***	0.24***	0.33***
Privacy Questions	0.60***	0.68***	0.27***	0.07	0.62***	0.59***

Table 3: Proxy LLMs' evaluations moderately correlate with participants' average perceptions of privacy preservation. The correlation between participants' perception and proxy LLMs is weak for helpfulness. $0.4 \leq \rho < 0.7$ is interpreted as moderate, and $\rho < 0.4$ is interpreted as weak (Akoglu, 2018). *** indicates statistical significance at $p < 0.001$.

Question	Participants	Gemma-3	GPT-5	Llama-3.3	Mistral	Qwen-3	All Proxy LLMs
H2	0.22	0.82	0.78	0.85	0.72	0.85	0.72
H3	0.21	0.78	0.76	0.82	0.69	0.81	0.67
P1	0.27	0.81	0.79	0.85	0.70	0.85	0.72
P2	0.18	0.82	0.80	0.82	0.67	0.82	0.69
P3	0.25	0.80	0.77	0.85	0.69	0.85	0.71
P4	0.25	0.78	0.75	0.84	0.66	0.84	0.66

Table 4: Per question average pair-wise semantic similarity between explanations provided by participants and proxy LLMs. Proxy LLMs provided responses that are much more semantically consistent than participants.

Demographic	Count	Percentage
Age		
18 - 24	2	2.13%
25 - 34	22	23.40%
35 - 44	33	35.11%
45 - 54	20	21.28%
55 - 64	10	10.64%
65 - 74	6	6.38%
75 - 84	1	1.06%
Gender		
Female	44	46.81%
Male	48	51.06%
Prefer to self-describe	2	2.13%
Education		
No high school degree	1	1.06%
High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent	9	9.57%
Some college credit, no degree	17	18.09%
Trade, technical, vocational training	3	3.19%
Associate's degree	12	12.77%
Bachelor's degree	29	30.85%
Master's degree	15	15.96%
Professional degree	1	1.06%
Doctorate degree	7	7.45%
Income		
Under $25,000	9	9.57%
$25,000 to $49,999	22	23.40%
$50,000 to $74,999	18	19.15%
$75,000 to $99,999	10	10.64%
$100,000 or more	35	37.23%

Table 5: Demographic information for 94 survey participants.

P1 and P2 Codes applied to explanations for privacy-preservation information sensitivity questions.

- academic info
- business info
- communication history
- contact info
- daily activities
- donor info
- employment info
- family info
- few private info
- financial info
- general summary
- health info
- legal info
- no private info
- personal info
- public info
- surprise event

P3 and P4 Codes applied to explanations for privacy norms complience and privacy preferences.

- disclose author identity
- excessive private info
- excessive private info->personal plans
- excessive sharing->communication history
- failed to disclose author identity
- good utility
- included donor summary
- leaked legal info
- leaked private info->business info
- leaked private info->credentials
- leaked private info->family info
- leaked private info->financial info
- leaked private info->health info
- leaked private info->legal info
- leaked private info->more than necessary
- leaked private info->personal info
- leaked sensitive files
- limited sharing
- limited sharing->business info
- limited sharing->no contact info
- limited sharing->no details
- limited sharing->no family info
- limited sharing->no financial info
- limited sharing->no general info
- limited sharing->no health info
- limited sharing->no private info
- limited sharing->only general info
- limited sharing->only necessary info
- limited sharing->only public info
- limited sharing->only user provided info
- limtied sharing->no contact info
- limtied sharing->no details
- limtied sharing->no private info
- limtied sharing->only general info
- meets privacy preferences
- needs improvement
- no utility
- private info shared internally
- violates laws