

Software Architectures for Graceful Degradation in Embedded Systems

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Software Architecture for Graceful Degradation

Introduction

- Software architecture and embedded systems
- Graceful degradation
- RoSES product family architecture

Example system: an elevator architecture

- Elevator Functionality
- System sensors/actuators
- Standard elevator architecture
- Preliminary architecture for graceful degradation
- Architectural concerns and evaluation
- Summary
- Future Questions

Software Architecture for Embedded Systems

Can we develop software architectures to promote graceful degradation in embedded systems?

Software Architecture

- Overall structure of system
- Decompose system into components and connectors
- Provide ability to reason about system at high level
- Several architectural styles/patterns have been identified

Embedded Systems

- Added system complexity/features is driving larger, more complex software
- Safety-critical, dependability
- Limited hardware resources, extremely cost-sensitive
- Traditional software architectural styles may not be appropriate

Graceful Degradation

- Individual component failures reduce functionality; do not cause system failure
 - Method to achieve robustness, safety, dependability
- Goal: Achieve graceful degradation without explicitly specifying all failure scenarios a priori
 - How can the system's software architecture influence graceful degradation?


Possible approaches

- Highly distributed
- No single point of failure
- Components are decoupled and autonomous
- Redundancy (not as effective for software)

Case Study: Elevator System

RoSES Product Family Architecture

- Different component configurations provide certain levels of functionality
- Specify architecture with minimum functionality as base configuration
- Focus on architecture for valid component configurations, not reconfiguration problems (Bill Nace's work)



Architectural Decisions

Explicitly specify component interfaces

- Construct all possible messages to be passed between components
- Helps determine which components need to communicate

Partition Functionality

- Separate critical and non-critical functionality
- Make critical components as autonomous as possible

Constrain component configurations

- Each component has minimal input/output interface
- Critical components must be present for base functionality

Elevator Functionality

Must transport people between floors


- Move car slowly in shaft
- Stop at every floor
- Open doors at each floor

Must ensure safety

- Do not crush people between doors
- Do not crush people between floor and elevator
- Do not run car at unsafe speeds
- Do not trap people in the elevator

Optimizations

- Only stop on requested floors
- Provide feedback to passengers
- Minimize travel time, wait time



Elevator System Sensors and Actuators

Sensors

- Elevator position and speed
 - AtFloor[f,d](v)
 - HoistwayLimit[d](v)
 - DriveSpeed(s,d)
- Door sensors
 - DoorClosed[j](v)
 - DoorOpen[j](v)
 - DoorReversal[j](v)
- Passenger requests
 - CarCall[f](v)
 - HallCall[f,d](b)


Control System State

- DesiredFloor(f,d)
- DesiredDwell(n)

Actuators


- Elevator control
 - DoorMotor[j](m)
 - Drive(s,d)
 - EmergencyBrake(b)
- Button lights
 - CarLight[f](k)
 - HallLight[f,d](k)
- Passenger feedback
 - CarLantern[d](k)
 - CarPositionIndicator(f)

Standard Elevator Control Architecture




Servo


Elevator Architecture: Product 1 (Base)




Elevator Architecture: Product 2



Elevator Architecture: Product 3



Elevator Architecture: Product 4



Elevator Control System

Main controllers are autonomous

- Drive Controller
- Door Controller
- Safety

Other controllers provide "advisory" information

- HallCall buttons
- CarCall buttons
- Dispatcher


Main controllers follow advice when available

- Must pass internal consistency checks
- In absence of advice, perform base functionality

Architectural Concerns (1)

Cost vs. Safety/Dependability

- Adding additional redundant sensors
 - Necessary to ensure safety for main controllers
 - Could add more for each secondary controller, but cost prohibitive



• Network

- Could be a single point of failure
- Without it need exponentially more sensors for more features
- Could add secondary network to increase dependability

Architectural Concerns (2)

Abstract sensor/actuator interface for components

- Components can access sensors from physical link or network without modifying code
- Logical interface separates software concerns from hardware concerns

System Configurations

- Designed into architecture to constrain configuration options
- Reconfiguration "hardwired"
- System should survive components failing in arbitrary order

Evaluation

• How can I evaluate my architectural design?

- Can't build working elevator and test it
- Simulation of a distrbuted network

Simulation framework exists from ECE 540/549 class

- Build executable system from my architecture
- Fault injection mechanisms to fail components during system operation
- Measure performance delivering passengers for each configuration

Summary

- Embedded Systems need methods to ensure safety, dependability, robustness
 - Graceful Degradation
- System's software architecture may strongly influence whether graceful degradation is achievable
- Design a software architecture for an elevator system
 - Distributed
 - Decoupling of components
 - Product family structure
 - Some hardware replication
- Build executable system and test it
- How well does it promote graceful degradation?

Future Questions

- Can we develop an architectural style specifically for graceful degradation?
 - Embedded systems have special concerns
 - Cost
 - Constrained resources

Can we apply it to multiple domains?

- Elevator
- Automobile navigation system
- Drive-by-Wire