

18-642: Single Points of Failure

11/6/2017



Carnegie
Mellon
University



Edge
Case
Research


Avoid Single Points of Failure

■ Anti-Patterns for Critical Software:

- Hardware single points of failure
- Correlated, accumulated multi-point failures
- Making assumptions about failures
- Non-diverse, low-SIL software

■ Fault Containment Region (FCR)

- Faults from outside FCR are kept out
 - Faults inside FCR are kept in
- But, within FCR a single fault has arbitrarily bad effects
 - It's like a shotgun blast inside the FCR
 - Applies to both SW faults and HW faults (e.g., single event upsets)




Toyota Unintended Acceleration (UA)

■ Perhaps 89 deaths, hundreds of serious injury lawsuits

- \$1.6B class action settlement
- Jury found system defective
 - Toyota “acted in reckless disregard”
- Many of issues were SW, but also a HW problem:

■ Two accelerator inputs


- But – **shared A/D converter**
- Could result in electronically “stuck” accelerator pedal



Single Point of Failure


Eliminating Single Points of Failure

- **Multiple FCRs required for life-critical and highly mission-critical systems**
 - This isolates faults in redundant components – no single point of failure
 - Avoid an Achilles' Heel in your system
 - All software on CPU can be a “single point”
- **Multi-channel (e.g., 2 of 2)**
 - Compare identical component outputs
- **Doer/Checker (monitor/actuator pair)**
 - “Checker” makes sure “Doer” is safe
- **Safety gate**
 - Only permits safe outputs to issue



■ Correlated faults if multiple FCRs are likely to fail together

- Common design faults (including software)
- Common manufacturing faults
- Shared infrastructure (e.g., power, clock)
- Physical coupling
 - Shared wiring harness, connectors
 - Shared location (e.g., hot spot)



USAF: <https://goo.gl/df5pdg>

■ Accumulated faults

- Fault not detected
- Fault not repaired before next mission

■ Safety is improved by using multiple FCRs

- Hardware redundancy / HW isolation
 - Typically each FCR should be an independent chip
- Software must be practically “perfect”
- Common patterns: multi-channel, checker, safety gate



■ Pitfalls are numerous and sometimes subtle

- Two copies of same SW fail the same way
- Ensure multi-channel doesn't fail as “always trust one channel”
- Ensure the checker doesn't fail as “always checks OK”
- Look for hidden correlation (HW design defects, shared libraries, shared requirement defects, physical connection, shared clock, shared power, ...)