

Random graph modeling  
of key predistribution schemes  
in wireless sensor networks

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## Wireless sensor networks (WSNs)

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- **Distributed** collection of **small** sensor nodes:
  - ◇ Have **limited** capability for computations and wireless communications.
  - ◇ Gather (security-sensitive) data and control (security-critical) operations.
- **Applications**
  - ◇ Military (Battlefield surveillance)
  - ◇ Health (Patient monitoring)
  - ◇ Home (“Smart” systems, home automation)
  - ◇ Environment (Monitoring fires in forests)

## WSNs and security

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- WSNs are usually deployed in **hostile** environments
  - ◇ Communications are monitored, and nodes are subject to capture and surreptitious use by an adversary.
- **Cryptographic protection** is needed to ensure secure communications.
- Scalable solutions with very low storage, management, and computational load are required.

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Random key predistribution schemes!

## Random key predistribution schemes

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- A large set of (cryptographic) keys: **Key pool**.
  - For each sensor  $i$ , a subset  $\Sigma_i$  is generated by some random mechanism: **Key ring** of  $i$ .
    - ◊ Inserted in the sensor's memory before deployment.
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**Principle:** Sensors  $i$  and  $j$  can communicate **securely** if

- i*) They have a wireless communication link available, **and**
- ii*) They have at least one key in common, i.e.

$$\Sigma_i \cap \Sigma_j \neq \emptyset.$$

## Goal: Evaluate key predistribution schemes

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A vast number of different key predistribution schemes have been proposed so far.

- ◇ Differ only in the mechanism that generates random key rings.

### Evaluating key predistribution schemes:

- How to **select the parameters** of a given scheme so that certain desired properties hold **with high probability**?
- How do various schemes compare with each other w.r.t. **connectivity, security, memory load, and scalability**?

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**Approach:** Random graph modeling

## Random graph modeling

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**Random graphs:** Natural models for random key predistribution schemes for wireless sensor networks:

◇ sensor  $\rightarrow$  node, secure link  $\rightarrow$  ?

◇ **Communication graph:** Eg., the disk model.

$$i \sim j \quad \text{iff} \quad \|\mathbf{x}_i - \mathbf{x}_j\| < \rho$$

◇ **Key graph:** Induced by the key predistribution scheme.

$$i \sim j \quad \text{iff} \quad \Sigma_i \cap \Sigma_j \neq \emptyset$$

## Intersecting random graphs

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**System model:** **Communication graph**  $\cap$  **Key graph:**

- $i \sim j$  if  $\Sigma_i \cap \Sigma_j \neq \emptyset$  and  $\|x_i - x_j\| < \rho$
- Many concerns regarding WSNs can be mapped into problems for this system model.

**A simple case of interest – Full visibility**

- Sensors are all within communication range of each other.
- System model = **Key graph**.
- Allows to focus on the randomized key predistribution.
- Key graph may have applications in other fields.

## My dissertation

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- The Eschenauer-Gligor (EG) scheme
  - ◇ Connectivity under full visibility [ISIT 2008-2009, CISS 2010, **IT 2012**]
  - ◇ Connectivity under an on-off channel model [**IT 2012**]
  - ◇ Triangle existence and small-world properties [Allerton 2009, GraphHoc 2009, **IT 2013**]
- The pairwise scheme of Chan, Perrig and Song
  - ◇ Connectivity under full visibility [ISIT 2012, **IT 2012**]
  - ◇ Connectivity under an on-off channel model [ICC, **IT 2013**]
  - ◇ Scalability (gradual deployment) [WiOpt 2011, **Perf Eval 2013**]
  - ◇ Security [PIMRC 2011, TISSEC 2013]



**The punch line**

	EG Scheme	Pairwise Scheme
Connectivity (Full Visibility)	$ \Sigma  = O(\log n)$	$ \Sigma _{n,\text{Avg}} = O(1)$ $ \Sigma _{n,\text{Max}} = O(\sqrt{\log n})$
Connectivity (On-Off Channel, $p_n$ )	$ \Sigma  = O(\frac{\log n}{p_n})$	$ \Sigma _{n,\text{Avg}} = O(\frac{\log n}{p_n})$ $ \Sigma _{n,\text{Max}} = O(\frac{\log n}{p_n})$
Gradual Deployment	$\checkmark$	$ \Sigma _{n,\text{Avg}} = O(\log n)$ $ \Sigma _{n,\text{Max}} = O(\log n)$
Unassailability	$ \Sigma  = O(\sqrt{n \log n})$	$ \Sigma _{n,\text{Avg}} = O(1)$ $ \Sigma _{n,\text{Max}} = O(\sqrt{\log n})$
Unsplittability	$ \Sigma  = O(\sqrt{n \log n})$	$ \Sigma _{n,\text{Avg}} = O(w_n)$ $ \Sigma _{n,\text{Max}} = O(\sqrt{w_n \log n})$
Perfect Resiliency	$\times$	$\checkmark$
Node Authentication	$\times$	$\checkmark$

$|\Sigma|$  : # of keys required       $w_n$  : Any function satisfying  $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} w_n = \infty$ .

## Today, we focus on the connectivity results for the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme

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1. “A zero-one law for connectivity in random key graphs”
  - ◇ O. Yağan and A. M. Makowski, *IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory* **58**(5): 2983-2999, May 2012.
  
2. “Performance of the Eschenauer-Gligor key distribution scheme under an ON-OFF channel”
  - ◇ O. Yağan, *IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory* **58**(6):3821-3835, June 2012.

## Eschenauer-Gligor (EG) scheme

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Before network deployment, each node **randomly** selects a set of  $K$  **distinct** keys from a (very large) pool of  $P$  keys.

- $n$ (# of nodes),  $P$ (key pool size),  $K$ (size of each key ring).
- $\Sigma_1, \dots, \Sigma_n$  iid and uniform in  $\mathcal{P}_K$ .

$\mathcal{P}_K$  : Collection of all subsets of  $\{1, \dots, P\}$  with size  $K$ .

**EG graph**  $\mathbb{K}(n; \theta)$ : Arises under the full visibility assumption.

$\theta \equiv (K, P)$ ,  $V = \{1, \dots, n\}$ ,  $E = \{i \sim j : \Sigma_i \cap \Sigma_j \neq \emptyset\}$

$$\mathbb{P}[i \sim j] = 1 - \frac{\binom{P-K}{K}}{\binom{P}{K}} := 1 - q(\theta) \simeq \frac{K^2}{P}$$

## Connectivity Results Under Full Visibility

## Connectivity of the EG graph (YM 2008)

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**Theorem 1** Consider a scaling  $K, P : \mathbb{N}_0 \rightarrow \mathbb{N}_0$  such that

$$\frac{K_n^2}{P_n} \sim c \frac{\log n}{n}$$

for some  $c > 0$ . If there exists some  $\sigma > 0$  such that  $\sigma n \leq P_n$ , then

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{P} \left[ \mathbb{K}(n; \theta_n) \text{ is connected} \right] = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } c < 1 \\ 1 & \text{if } c > 1. \end{cases}$$

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Blackburn & Gerke (2008): Theorem 1 with  $P_n = o(n)$ .

Rybarczyk (2009): Theorem 1 **without** any constraint on  $P_n$ .

## Why sharp zero-one laws are useful?

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- Connectivity is at **odds** with other network properties.
- Recall that  $\mathbb{P}[i \sim j] \simeq \frac{K^2}{P}$
- To increase the chances of connectivity;
  - ◊ Increase  $K \Rightarrow$  Larger key rings, **larger memory** req.
  - ◊ Decrease  $P \Rightarrow$  Larger  $K/P$  ratio, **less resiliency** against node capture attacks.
- Sharp zero-one laws provide a **precise** threshold of connectivity.
  - ◊ Knowing the exact minimum requirements for ensuring connectivity, one can dimension the scheme without suffering performance losses in other properties.

**Connectivity Results**  
**Under non-full visibility**



## A simple communication model

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- Assume that communication channels are mutually independent, and each channel is either **on** or **off**.
- With  $p$  in  $(0, 1)$ , consider i.i.d.  $\{0, 1\}$ -valued rvs with success probability  $p$ .
  - ◇ The channel between nodes  $i$  and  $j$  is available with probability  $p$  and unavailable with the complementary probability  $1 - p$ .
  - ◇ Also known as **ON-OFF Fading Channel**.
- Can be modeled by an Erdős-Rényi (ER) graph  $\mathbb{G}(n; p)$ .

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The overall system model is the *intersection*  $\mathbb{K}(n; \theta) \cap \mathbb{G}(n; p)$ .

## Connectivity of EG scheme under on-off channel

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**Model:**  $\mathbb{K} \cap \mathbb{G}(n; \theta, p) \Rightarrow \mathbb{P}[i \sim j] = p(1 - q(\theta)).$

**Theorem 2 (Yağan, IT 2012)** Consider scalings  $K, P : \mathbb{N}_0 \rightarrow \mathbb{N}_0$  and  $p : \mathbb{N}_0 \rightarrow (0, 1)$  such that

$$p_n(1 - q(\theta_n)) \sim c \frac{\log n}{n}, \quad n = 1, 2, \dots$$

for some  $c > 0$ . If  $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} p_n \log n = p^*$  exists and there exists some  $\sigma > 0$  such that

$$\sigma n \leq P_n$$

then we have

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{P} \left[ \mathbb{K} \cap \mathbb{G}(n; \theta_n, p_n) \text{ is connected} \right] = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } c < 1 \\ 1 & \text{if } c > 1. \end{cases}$$

## Connectivity under the disk model?

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- Nodes are distributed over a bounded region  $\mathcal{D}$  of the plane
- **Disk model:** Nodes  $i$  and  $j$  located at  $\mathbf{x}_i$  and  $\mathbf{x}_j$ , respectively, in  $\mathcal{D}$  are able to communicate if

$$\|\mathbf{x}_i - \mathbf{x}_j\| < \rho \quad (1)$$

- $\rho$  : transmission range of sensors
- **Random geometric graph**,  $\mathbb{H}(n; \rho)$ : Induced under (1) when nodes are independently and uniformly distributed over  $\mathcal{D}$
- If  $\mathcal{D}$  is **unit torus**, then  $\mathbb{P}[i \sim j] = \pi\rho^2$

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The overall system model is the *intersection*  $\mathbb{K}(n; \theta) \cap \mathbb{H}(n; \rho)$ .

## A natural conjecture

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**Conjecture 1 (Yağan, IT 2012)** *Consider scalings*

*$K, P : \mathbb{N}_0 \rightarrow \mathbb{N}_0$  and  $\rho : \mathbb{N}_0 \rightarrow (0, 1/\sqrt{\pi})$  such that*

$$\pi \rho_n^2 \cdot (1 - q(\theta_n)) \sim c \frac{\log n}{n}, \quad n = 1, 2, \dots \quad (2)$$


*for some  $c > 0$ . Then we have*

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{P} \left[ \mathbb{K} \cap \mathbb{H}(n; \theta_n, \rho_n) \text{ is connected} \right] = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } c < 1 \\ 1 & \text{if } c > 1. \end{cases}$$


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**Conjecture:** Theorem 2 holds when **On-Off** communication model is replaced by the **Disk** model.

## Supporting evidence



(a)



(b)

- a) Probability of connectivity under the **on-off** channel model.  
 b) Probability of connectivity under the **disk model** with  $\pi\rho^2 = p$ .

**Figures are almost indistinguishable!**

## Partial results on the conjecture

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- **Yi et al.** established the zero-law; i.e, under (2), they showed

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{P} \left[ \mathbb{K} \cap \mathbb{H}(n; \theta_n, \rho_n) \text{ is connected} \right] = 0 \quad \text{if } c < 1$$

- **Di Pietro et al.** showed that

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{P} \left[ \mathbb{K} \cap \mathbb{H}(n; \theta_n, \rho_n) \text{ is connected} \right] = 1 \quad \text{if } c > 20\pi$$

- **Krzywdzinski and Rybarczyk** showed that

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{P} \left[ \mathbb{K} \cap \mathbb{H}(n; \theta_n, \rho_n) \text{ is connected} \right] = 1 \quad \text{if } c > 8$$

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No result exists for the connectivity when  $1 < c \leq 8 \Rightarrow$

An important **gap** given the **trade-offs** vs. security and memory

## A related conjecture by Gupta & Kumar

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**Model:** Random geometric graph with randomly deleted links.

$$\mathbb{G} \cap \mathbb{H}(n; p, \rho) \Rightarrow \mathbb{P}[i \sim j] = p(\pi \rho^2).$$

**Conjecture 2 (Gupta & Kumar, 1998)** Consider scalings  $p : \mathbb{N}_0 \rightarrow (0, 1)$  and  $\rho : \mathbb{N}_0 \rightarrow (0, 1/\sqrt{\pi})$  such that

$$p_n \cdot \pi \rho_n^2 \sim c \frac{\log n}{n}, \quad n = 1, 2, \dots$$

for some  $c > 0$ . Then, we have

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{P} \left[ \mathbb{G} \cap \mathbb{H}(n; p_n, \rho_n) \text{ is connected} \right] = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } c < 1 \\ 1 & \text{if } c > 1. \end{cases}$$

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**Not resolved! Open since 15 years!**

## A summary of connectivity results for intersection of random graphs

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- **ER graph**  $\cap$  **Random Geometric Graph**
  - ◇ Conjecture by Gupta & Kumar, 1998: **Open** for  $1 < c \leq 8$
- **EG graph**  $\cap$  **Random Geometric Graph**
  - ◇ Conjecture by Yağan, 2012: **Open** for  $1 < c \leq 8$
- **EG Graph**  $\cap$  **ER Graph**
  - ◇ A sharp zero-one law is **available**, Yağan, **IT** 2012.
- **Random  $K$ -out Graph**  $\cap$  **ER Graph** (Not covered today)
  - ◇ A sharp zero-one law is **available**, Yağan & Makowski, **IT**.

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Theorem 2 is the first\* *complete* zero-one law established for the connectivity of the *intersection* of random graphs.



**Thanks!**

**Visit [www.andrew.cmu.edu/~oyagan](http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/~oyagan) for references..**