

Network Design and Performance Analysis for Reliable Inference in Distributed Systems

12/11/2023


SNAPP Seminar



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PhD Candidate

Carnegie Mellon University



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UC Berkeley

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Research Overview

Theme *How can we leverage network structure to better understand and design socio-technical systems?*

Thrusts Network design and performance analysis
for reliable inference in distributed systems


Modeling, analyzing, and controlling
spreading processes in social networks

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Contributions Formal characterization of strength of connectivity of 'random K-out graphs'

IEEE Transactions on Information Theory '21, '23
IEEE ICC '21 (Best Paper Award)
ISIT '21, '20, CDC '20, Globecom '19



Ongoing, future work Privacy-scalability frontiers in distributed & decentralized learning

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Analyzing spreading processes triggered by evolving contagions

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
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


(Today's focus)

Formal characterization of strength of connectivity of 'random K-out graphs'

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(Joint work with O. Yagan and E. C. Elumar)



Analyzing spreading processes triggered by evolving contagions

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Contributions

Random K -out Graphs

$\mathbb{H}(n, K)$

Each node selects K neighboring nodes
chosen uniformly at random from all $n-1$ nodes

Edge (i, j) exists if

node i selects node j

or


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
Random 2-out graph on 6 nodes
($K = 2, n = 6$)

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
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
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Connectivity

[Fenner and Frieze '82]

Random K -out
Graphs $\mathbb{H}(n, K)$


For $K \geq 2$, *connected* with high probability (with probability $\rightarrow 1$ as # nodes $\rightarrow \infty$).
(for $K = 1$, disconnected with high probability)

Connectivity

[Fenner and Frieze '82]

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
With average degree ~ 4 , we get connectivity whp

Connectivity

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With average degree ~ 4 , we get connectivity whp

Erdos Renyi
Random Graphs
 $\mathbb{G}(n, p)$

In contrast Erdos Renyi random graphs
require average degree $\sim \underline{\log n}$ for connectivity whp

scales with n

Connectivity


[Fenner and Frieze '82]

Random K -out
Graphs $\mathbb{H}(n, K)$

For $K \geq 2$, *connected* with high probability (with probability $\rightarrow 1$ as # nodes $\rightarrow \infty$).
(for $K = 1$, *disconnected* with high probability)

Theorem [Sood and Yagan, ICC'21*]

$$\mathbb{P}[\mathbb{H}(n, K) \text{ is } \textit{connected}] = 1 - \Theta(1/n^{K^2-1}), K \geq 2$$



*Best Paper Award

What if K is not same for all nodes?

So far...

For (homogeneous) random K -out graphs, $p_{\text{connectivity}} = 1 - \Theta(1/n^{K^2-1})$, $K \geq 2$

What if some nodes make fewer than 2 selections?

Inhomogeneous Random K -out Graphs

- Each node is assigned a type which determines the number of selections
- Nodes can make fewer than 2 selections


Inhomogeneous Random K -out Graphs

$$\mathbb{H}(n, \mu, K_n)$$

n : number of nodes

Label nodes independently as

Type-I wp μ (>0), Type-II wp $1-\mu$



Inhomogeneous K -out Random graph ($n = 6, K_n = 3$)


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
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Type-II nodes select K_n (≥ 2) nodes

(uniformly at random from all $n-1$ nodes)



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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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(Joint work with O. Yagan and E. C. Elumar)

How to quantify strength of connectivity?



Related work

Increasing *strength* of connectivity 



Weakest

Strongest

a 'giant' component
 $|C_{\max}| = \Omega(n)$

1-connectivity
 $|C_{\max}| = n$

k -connectivity
($k \geq 2$)

Inhomogeneous
Random K -out
Graphs

$$\mathbb{H}(n, \mu, K_n)$$

?

$K_n = \omega(1)$ [Eletreby & Yagan, '19]

?

Homogeneous
Random K -out
Graphs

$$\mathbb{H}(n, K_n)$$

?

$K_n \geq 2$ [Fenner & Frieze '82]

?

Tighter bounds?

what if a random subset of nodes fail?

$K_n \geq 2k$
[Fenner & Frieze '82]

Key Contributions

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
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


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K -out graphs in action: Distributed pairwise masking

Setting: compute $\sum_i w_i$
without revealing w_i




K -out graphs in action: Distributed pairwise masking

Setting: compute $\sum_i w_i$
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Approach: add pairwise masks
that cancel in aggregate

[Sabater et al. '20], [Bell et al. '20], ...




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


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
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
Random K -out graphs have been proposed
to balance sparsity with connectivity

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
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
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What if there are multiple corrupt nodes?
Is the subgraph of honest nodes connected?
Can we characterize the size of connected subgraphs of honest nodes?

....

Our results in action: Distributed pairwise masking

What if there are multiple corrupt nodes?

How to select K_n to ensure privacy properties for the subgraph of honest nodes?

Suppose δ_n nodes chosen uniformly at random from $\mathbb{H}(n, K_n)$ are corrupt

Let $\mathcal{S}(n, K_n, \delta_n)$ denote the subgraph of honest nodes

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How to select K_n to ensure as δ_n varies that:

- $\mathcal{S}(n, K_n, \delta_n)$ is connected whp?
- $|C_{\max}(\mathcal{S}(n, K_n, \delta_n))| \geq T_n$ whp?

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
• $\mathcal{S}(n, K_n, \delta_n)$ is connected whp? $K_n = \Omega(\log(\delta_n))$ $o(n), \omega(1)$

• $|C_{\max}(\mathcal{S}(n, K_n, \delta_n))| \geq T_n$ whp? $K_n \geq 2$

$n(1 - o(1))$

Key Contributions

Increasing *strength* of connectivity →



Homogeneous Random K -out Graphs

$\mathbb{H}(n, K_n)$

Provide K_n required to ensure a given $|C_{\max}|$ whp as a function of size of random node failures

$K_n \geq 2$ [Fenner & Frieze '82]

$p_{\text{con}} = 1 - \Theta(1/n^{K^2-1}), K \geq 2$

$p_{\text{con}} \rightarrow 1$ even after $o(\sqrt{n})$ nodes fail (additional results for other failure regimes)

$K_n \geq 2k$
[Fenner & Frieze '82]

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$$(k \geq 2)$$

**Inhomogeneous
Random K -out
Graphs**

$$\mathbb{H}(n, \mu, K_n)$$

For any $K_n \geq 2$ (whp)

$$|C_{\max}| = n - O(1)$$

(even after $O(1)$ nodes fail)

$$|C_{\max}| = n(1 - o(1))$$

after $o(n)$ nodes fail

$$K_n = \omega(1)$$
 [Eletreby & Yagan, '19]

$$K_n = \Omega(\log n)$$

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other failure regimes)



$$K_n \geq 2k$$
 [Fenner & Frieze '82]

Research Overview

Theme *How can we leverage network structure to better understand and design socio-technical systems?*

Thrusts Network design and performance analysis for reliable inference in distributed systems

Modeling, analyzing, and controlling spreading processes in social networks



Contributions Formal characterization of strength of connectivity of 'random K-out graphs'

Analyzing spreading processes triggered by evolving contagions

IEEE Transactions on Information Theory '21, '23 (Today's focus)
IEEE ICC '21 (Best Paper Award)
ISIT '21, '20, CDC '20, Globecom '19

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, '23
IEEE ICC '23



(Joint work with O. Yagan and E. C. Elumar)

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Ongoing, future work Privacy-scalability frontiers in distributed & decentralized learning

Decentralized content moderation
Cross-platform interactions & information spread

Thanks

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